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This Article examines how law influences social norms. It seeks to
understand the characteristics of law that influence opinions about the
social acceptability of regulated behavior. To this end, the Authors
examined the practice of sharing digital files of copyrighted material,
file sharing, by conducting an experiment to identify the characteristics
of copyright law that influence perceptions of social norms about
unlawful file sharing. Even though college students surveyed believe
that peer-to-peer file sharing is common practice, they thought the
practice would become less socially acceptable if violators were subject
to shaming penalties. They also expressed less willingness personally to
engage in file sharing if violators were subject to revocation of university
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network privileges. These results suggest that both formal and informal
sanctions associated with copyright regulations influenced perceptions of
file sharing norms. At the same time, law did not influence perceptions of
file sharing norms in the absence of sanctions, nor did making salient the
moral justifications for refraining from unlawful file sharing. This
Article discusses the implications of these results both for the theoretical
debate about the expressive function of the law and the policy debate
over unlawful file sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In certain areas of life, there are many easy opportunities to violate the
law where the resulting harm is apparently minimal; the presence of
ready opportunity and absence of serious harm make such violations
common. In extreme cases, violating the law is the norm. In these
situations, it is very difficult for law to influence behavior. People see
no moral obstacle, and they notice that most other people do not hesitate
to engage in the behavior. Aside from the law, every relevant source
signals that the behavior in question is permissible. Examples of laws
that are widely ignored include traffic laws,1 tax laws,2 and more recently,
laws governing peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted material.
Is it possible for law to influence behavior in these situations? There
is no doubt that dramatically increasing penalties for violating these
widely ignored laws would eventually result in deterrent effects—one
can imagine the widespread caution on the road if the penalty for
speeding were one year in prison for every one mile per hour over the
speed limit. But such measures are both extreme and beside the point.
In this Article, we address the question of whether law can shift the
existing social norm so that people change their views of the social
1. See Edward Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 681-93 (2006); Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational
Postures and Non-compliant Actions, in TAXING DEMOCRACY 15, 15-39 (Valerie
Braithwaite ed., 2003) (estimating that a substantial portion of the population is resistant
to paying income taxes). In addition to income tax resistance, the problem of sales tax
evasion has become more widespread, as witnessed by the popularity of Internet
commerce sites that do not collect sales tax, such as Amazon.com. See Austan Goolsbee,
In a World Without Borders: The Impact of Taxes on Internet Commerce, 115 Q.J. ECON.
561, 561 n.1 (2000) (“Every state requires consumers to pay a use tax (at the sales tax
rate) for any out-of-state catalog or Internet purchases. . . . Noncompliance is
widespread so the transactions are, effectively, tax-free.”).
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acceptability of the act in question. If law can do this, even in domains
where the prohibited behavior was once widespread, then the more
interesting question is how law is able to shift existing social norms in
these situations. A central idea in the literature on law and social norms
is that law can influence behavior expressively—simply by what it
says—and independently of sanctions it threatens.3 Several accounts of
expressive law assume that law influences social norms by changing
perceptions about others’ attitudes about the behavior in question.4 That
is, when a law comes to the attention of a citizen, that citizen changes
her perceptions of the extent to which others will engage in and approve
of the behavior that law seeks to regulate. This Article reports the
results of an original experiment designed to test the questions: What is
it about law that causes people to perceive changes in the relevant social
norm? Do formal sanctions cause the citizen to believe that others will
no longer approve of or engage in the regulated behavior? Do informal
sanctions associated with violating law, such as shame, stigma, and
social disapproval cause the citizen to believe that others will no longer
approve of or engage in the regulated behavior? Does violation of the
law imply a moral violation that the citizen believes will change the
prevailing social norms? Finally, does the citizen believe that others
believe that law ought to be obeyed, and that the legitimacy inherent in
law will change the perception of the prevailing social norms? These
questions are fundamental to an understanding of how law works, yet,
somewhat surprisingly, they remain unaddressed in the rapidly growing
literature on law and social norms.5
This Article addresses these questions in the context of one of the
most controversial types of prohibited yet common activities—peer-topeer file sharing. This Article reports an experiment conducted to
examine whether law can shift existing file sharing norms toward
compliance and, if so, what mechanisms are likely to cause this. The
results are surprising: even though peer-to-peer file sharing is perceived
as a pervasive practice, the threat of divulging and publicizing the names
of file sharers causes the social norm to shift, and the practice becomes less
socially acceptable. The threat of publicizing offenders also led our
respondents to report being less likely to engage in file sharing
themselves. Thus, even though the practice of peer-to-peer file sharing
is prevalent—especially among a college student sample—people are
less willing to engage in the practice under a spotlight.

3.
4.
5.
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This Article addresses the features of law that are thought to cause
shifts in social norms and contributes much needed data to help shed
light on how these features operate. Identification and understanding of
these mechanisms will help policymakers construct legislation and
enforcement mechanisms that carry the greatest promise of shifting
existing social norms in the desired direction. Until now, much of the
discussion on the relationship between law and norms has been framed
in the abstract. By framing the discussion around a set of specific norms
about file sharing and employing a rich body of theory about the
mechanisms through which law can change social norms, this Article
presents a set of claims and recommendations that aspire to be both
theoretically sound and practically relevant.
The next Part provides background about the law governing file
sharing and the evolving social norms regarding such practices. Part III
offers a general review of the existing literature on expressive law and
the interaction of law and social norms. Part IV describes the experimental
methodology and results. Finally, Part V examines the meaning of the
results and their implications for file sharing policy.
II. FILE SHARING: LAW ON THE BOOKS AND LAW IN ACTION6
A. Law on the Books
Federal copyright law includes both criminal and civil provisions that
target copyright infringement. Traditionally, federal criminal law targeted
only infringement by competitors of copyright holders, but recent
criminal provisions also target those who infringe for personal use.7 The
No Electronic Theft Act of 1997 (NET) criminalizes noncompetitive
infringement, such as downloading and uploading with no profit motive,
and imposes penalties including substantial imprisonment.8 The NET
6. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910), for one of the earliest accounts of this distinction.
7. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 747-52 (2003)
(discussing the theoretical justification for viewing personal use infringement as a
criminal act).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000). The maximum penalties differ depending
on the type of infringement and the number of prior offenses. For example, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319(b) deals with infringement for commercial advantage or financial gain and
provides for imprisonment for up to ten years for a second offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)
(2000). 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c) deals with infringement involving a total retail value of
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prohibits copying or distributing copyrighted work with a value of over
$1000 within a 180 day period.9 This threshold is easily reached by
those who engage in unauthorized downloading or uploading of music
and video files on the Internet.10 A copyright infringer may also be
civilly liable for either actual damages to the copyright holder plus
disgorgement of profits or, alternatively, statutory damages—up to
$30,000 per work for innocent infringement or, at the court’s discretion,
up to $150,00011 per work plus attorney’s fees12 in cases of willful
infringement. Thus, a college student caught with 100 infringing songs
on her computer could be liable for between $3 million and $15 million,
depending on whether the infringement was innocent or willful.13
Clearly Congress views copyright infringement as a serious matter.
Hence, the law on the books regarding file sharing carries with it
powerful means of enforcement.
B. Law in Action
1. Extent of Unlawful File Sharing
In sharp contrast to the severity of the law, file sharing practices are
extremely prevalent. The music industry contends that more than 2.6
billion infringing music files are downloaded every month.14 According
to surveys conducted in July 2003 by the Pew Internet and American
Life Project,15 about half of all Americans ages twelve to twenty-two
with access to the Internet have downloaded music from file sharing
networks like KaZaA and Morpheus. Despite the popular belief that file
over $1000 in a six month period and provides for imprisonment for up to six years in
certain cases. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c) (2000).
9. Another provision, The Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA),
criminalizes the circumvention of encryption codes that protect copyrighted material.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
10. The Napster court rejected the argument that such activities were protected by
fair use. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
Although the Napster case was a civil action, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the fair use
defense implicated criminal prosecutions by construing 17 U.S.C. § 106, which defines
the subject matter and scope of copyright generally.
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
13. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1396 n.204 (2004).
Lemley and Reese raise awareness of the harm to innovation that could be created if
legal rules found innovators liable for copyright infringement committed by users of
their innovations. See generally id.
14. See Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Co. Petitioners at 12, MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125B S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).
15. See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug
Off Guilt and Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at C2.
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sharing is limited only to teenagers, 27% of Internet users between the
ages of thirty and forty-nine and 12% of those over fifty engage in file
sharing. Furthermore, the Pew study also found that among the 35
million adults in its survey who download music, 23 million said they
did not care much about the copyright on the files they copied. Among
the 26 million people who made files available for others to copy, 17
million did not care much whether they were copyrighted. Another
research firm estimates that between 2003 and 2005, the number of users
on peer-to-peer networks like Grokster and Limewire had more than
doubled from 3.8 million to 8.7 million users.16
2. Harms Associated with Unlawful File Sharing
The harms associated with copyright infringement are often difficult
to measure.17 The music industry has blamed the recent decline in CD
sales on the widespread practice of file sharing, but estimating how
much of this decline, if any, is attributable to file sharing remains a
challenge.18 Potential exists for harm to community interests if the
unauthorized use of copyrighted material removes artists’ incentives to
create new works.19 Some courts and commentators treat the copyright
holder’s rights as equivalent to rights that attach to physical property, so
that infringement is viewed straightforwardly as theft.20 On the other
hand, some economists have recently questioned the extent of actual
harm associated with file sharing. For example, Peter Alexander has
16. See Roben Farzad, File Swappers Get Creative as Wheels of Justice Turn,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at C13.
17. For a comparison of the various methods used to measure the impact of file
sharing on copyright owners, see Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of
File-Sharing on the Sound Recording Market, 51 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 435 (2005),
although his own conclusion is that in most cases file sharing harms copyrights owners.
18. It is also not clear how much of the sales decline is attributable to market
factors such as pricing and saturation. In addition, some lost sales may have been offset
by consumers who purchase a CD only because they decided to do so after downloading
it unlawfully.
19. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (arguing that strong rights could harm
innovation leading to fewer works at higher costs).
20. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[T]aking what is not yours and not freely offered to you is stealing.”). This view
arguably glosses over the fact that copyright owners only own the copyright itself, not
the work—which survives copyright expiration—or embodiments of the work. 17
U.S.C. § 202 (2000); see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,
1263-64 (11th Cir. 2001); Moohr, supra note 7, at 766.
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drawn attention to the harms associated with the music industry being a
highly concentrated five firm oligopoly.21 Others have focused on network
effects of file sharing that might actually increase the willingness of
people to purchase CDs.22 Recently, Oberholzer and Strumpf have
argued even more forcefully against the negative impact of file sharing.
Using an innovative and methodical approach with real time data, they
argue that there is no proven detrimental effect from file sharing.23 On
balance, however, if there is an emerging consensus, it points toward the
conclusion that file sharing does indeed impose negative economic
consequences on the music industry.24
C. Moral Acceptability of Unlawful File Sharing
Despite the fact that copyright policy is intended to prevent harm to
artists’ property interests and provide incentives for creative expression,
copyright law does not enjoy widespread popular support in the context
of file sharing. There is ample evidence that many people view
unauthorized file sharing for personal use as morally acceptable.25 The
moral acceptability of sharing copyrighted music is especially strong
among young people.26 The following sections discuss several related
explanations that might account for this.

21. See Peter J. Alexander, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: The Case of the Music
Recording Industry, 20 REV. INDUS. ORG. 151 (2002).
22. See, e.g., Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized
Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities,
42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155 (1994) (arguing that when demand network externalities are
considered, copying can lead to both greater profits and social welfare).
23. See Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on
Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (2004), http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/
FileSharing_March2004.pdf.
24. See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma
of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 736-44
(2005) (arguing that the current empirical evidence points to a link between downloading
and reduced music sales); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C’s: Music
Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students,
49 J. L. & ECON. 29 (2006) (concluding that every ten downloads result in one or two
lost CD sales); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music
Purchases, 49 J. L. & ECON. 63, 79 (2006) (estimating that file sharing reduces the
probability of buying music by 30 percent); see also Daniel Gross, Does a Free
Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 3, at 4.
25. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 767 n.165 (citing a survey of 1000 people by
Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch which found that “59% did not think it is wrong to
download free music online, 11% thought it was wrong but said they would probably do
it, and only 18% thought it was wrong and would not do it”).
26. See Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 15, at C2 (discussing the Pew Internet
and American Life Project of July 2003).
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1. Intangible as Free
Many people have difficulty seeing the wrong of “stealing” intangible
assets.27 In fact, 78% of Internet users who download music do not
consider it stealing.28 Among the general public, opinion was evenly
split in a 2002 survey: half said downloading is morally permissible, and
half said it is not.29 In this sense, the sharing of digital music files might
be viewed in the same way as speeding—morally acceptable if done in
moderation.30 The ease with which files are unlawfully shared might
itself promote a lack of respect for copyright law.31
2. The Internet as Free
The Internet sprang from a research culture where information of all
kinds was freely shared.32 That outlook still resonates with millions of
users who routinely download music onto their computers.33 By heritage
and design, the Internet represents a particularly distributive technology.
It permits every user in every living room to function as a mass
distributor of just about anything that can be digitized including film,
photography, the written word, and, of course, music. With music file
sharing, the technological possibilities have driven development of the
cultural norm. College students, in particular, have grown up viewing
the Internet as a way of accessing things for free.34

27. See Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of Trade Secrets:
Tangibility, Authorship and Legality, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197 (2006)
(demonstrating that employees had difficulty grasping the wrongdoing associated with
using intangible confidential information).
28. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 542-43
(2003) (citing data from a Pew Internet and American Life Project poll in 2000).
29. Id. at 543-44 (citing a 2002 poll by Edison Media Research).
30. See Cheng, supra note 1 (examining the regulation of tax evasion, speeding,
and music piracy); Raymond, supra note 1 (arguing that penumbral crimes—those with a
high level of noncompliance—exist in many areas of life and encourage undesirable
behavior, endangering the law obedience norm).
31. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 724-26 (2003).
32. See Steve Lohr, Ideas & Trends: The Sharing Society; In the Age of the
Internet, Whatever Will Be Will Be Free, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 4, at 1.
33. Id.
34. See Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students over Music
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003, at A1.
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3. Privacy, Convenience, and Lack of Alternatives
For many, downloading files from the Internet is the easiest and most
comfortable way to obtain music and other media products. Music
consumers maintain that this “convenience factor” is especially important
given the lack of satisfactory online alternatives.35 They perceive the
alternatives presented by the music industry as very limited, especially
when compared to the wide selection of music styles offered by file
sharing software. This is changing rapidly, however, with the advent of
digital music sales in which users pay fees to music services like iTunes
to download music.
4. Experimentation
Many consumers feel that downloading and sharing music files allows
them to make wiser decisions about whether to purchase specific CDs.
For some listeners, file sharing has become a way to experiment by
trying new music without paying first. This is consistent with research
that claims that the decline in CD sales is attributable not to the
extensive use of file sharing software,36 but to other factors including a
long economic recession.37 According to this line of argument, if a
consumer likes a particular artist, he or she will actually buy the CD, so
the number of those who download music instead of buying the CD is
small.
5. Perceptions of Legality
Surveys of file sharing network users show that people do not think
their own file sharing activities constitute a violation of copyright laws.38
Prior to the recent wave of industry lawsuits against individuals engaged
in file sharing, the assumption prevailed that file sharing is both socially
acceptable and legal. People reasoned that Napster—the company that
drove the original wave of online music piracy—had been shut down
after the record companies sued and that the file sharing networks that
survived must be operating within the law—otherwise, they would
already have been shut down.39 The advent of highly publicized
industry lawsuits against individuals may have dispelled the notion that
35. See Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 15, at C2.
36. See Oberholzer & Strumpf, supra note 23, at 24.
37. John Schwartz, A Heretical View of File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at
C1; see also Gross, supra note 24, § 3, at 4.
38. See Lohr, supra note 32.
39. See Amy Harmon, Subpoenas Sent to File-Sharers Prompt Anger and
Remorse, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at C1.
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file sharing is always lawful. Recent survey data suggests, however, that
despite the recent crackdowns by the industry, many people believe that
individual file sharers should not be held responsible for pirating, and
that government efforts to reduce file sharing are unlikely to be
effective.40
6. Perceptions of Recording Industry Greed
One popular argument for the legitimacy of file sharing focuses on the
high price of CDs. Many believe that the record companies charge too
much for CDs and that therefore music sharing is justified, even if it is
stealing.41 This view is aggravated by the fact that music consumers
believe the recording industry exploits artists. The following quote from
a twenty-one-year-old college student is representative: “They’re a
bunch of greed heads . . . . They’ve been really fat on what I think of as
huge profits and now they are trying to maintain the status quo.”42 This
perception is accompanied by the accusation that recording artists do not
get a worthy percentage of profits. Statements like the following are
common: “If the money went into the artist’s pocket, I’d have more of a
dilemma. But the companies make enough money.”43
Indeed, artists themselves seem to play a crucial role in shaping young
people’s views toward file sharing. People who engage in unlawful file
sharing often point to high-profile musicians who acknowledge that file
sharing has provided them with valuable exposure.44 It is important to
emphasize that artists differ in their attitudes toward the Recording
Industry Association of America’s (RIAA) legal actions and its general
perspective on file sharing. Metallica, for instance, has spoken strongly
and repeatedly in favor of the recording industry’s crackdown. At the
same time, other influential musicians like Moby, System of a Down,
and Public Enemy contend that the recording industry’s efforts are

40. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Pew Internet Project Data Memo, Pew Internet &
Am. Life Project (Mar. 2005), http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/PIP_Filesharing_March05
.pdf.
41. See Amy Harmon, In Fight Over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a Carrot,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at A1.
42. Id.
43. See John Leland, Praise God and Pass the Music Files, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2004, § 4, at 4.
44. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Pew File-Sharing Survey Gives a Voice to Artists, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at E1.
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misguided and that it must work with the new technology instead of
against it.45
D. Industry Response to Violations of Copyright Law
The industry responded to widespread unlawful file sharing by
targeting network operators. One popular early network, Napster, operated
a centralized file server that directed traffic by collecting data about files
available for sharing. The RIAA sued Napster in 1999 for contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement, and a federal court ruled that its
method of facilitating file sharing through a central server amounted to
copyright infringement.46 After a court ordered it to block access to
infringing files, Napster shut down in 2001.47
After the demise of Napster, peer-to-peer (p2p) software that did not
involve any central server emerged. Instead, these new p2p services
facilitated file transfers by allowing users to search directly on other
users’ computers.48 In 2003, the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court
injunction against the p2p service Aimster, finding that plaintiffs were
likely to prevail because the service had been used exclusively for
infringement and the company had made no effort to limit infringement.49
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit found that two distributors that offer
the Morpheus file sharing service, Grokster and Streamcast, were not
liable for aiding copyright infringement because they could not monitor
or control how their users exchanged files.50 In 2005, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that such distributors—whose software is used by
millions of people—can be held liable for aiding copyright infringement
because their business models depended on infringing file sharing.51
In the meantime, the industry also began suing individual users.52
This was a turning point for the music industry, which had sought to
avoid direct conflict with its potential consumers as it battled online
piracy. To advance this strategy, the RIAA initially forced Verizon
Internet Services to turn over the names of online subscribers accused of

45. See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in Middle,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at A1.
46. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
47. See Lawrence Iser & James Toma, Battling Digital Piracy: Recording Industry
Has Taken a Multipronged Response to Illegally Downloaded Music, 25 NAT’L L.J. C1,
at C1 (2003).
48. Id.
49. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
50. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
51. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
52. See Iser & Toma, supra note 47.
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illegal copying.53 Verizon successfully appealed the lower court decision
on statutory grounds, however, setting back the RIAA’s strategy of
uncloaking suspected file sharers.54
E. The Gap Between Law and Norms
It is now apparent that a considerable gap exists between the law,
which prohibits the practice of file sharing and imposes ever increasing
sanctions,55 and social norms, which are permissive toward file sharing.
Recent attempts by the music industry to reduce illegal downloading
have focused mainly on deterrence. The RIAA has brought widely
publicized civil actions against violators despite the public relations risk
associated with suing one’s customers.56 Public opinion about this
strategy has been mixed, and media attention has sometimes focused on
cases involving particularly sympathetic defendants.57 Although it is too
early to estimate with certainty, the music industry’s deterrence strategy
seems to be leading to mixed results.58 Interestingly, the music industry’s
53. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. (In re Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc.), 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (requiring Verizon to disclose
the name of a subscriber accused of downloading 600 songs in one day).
54. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the absence of express language in the DMCA regarding
disclosure of names of suspected violators precludes ordering such disclosure).
Currently, the RIAA is using “John Doe” proceedings to pursue those suspected of
unlawful file sharing. This procedure is relatively cumbersome compared with the
subpoena process that the RIAA attempted in the Verizon case. See David Gorski, Note,
The Future of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Subpoena Power on the
Internet in Light of the Verizon Cases, 24 REV. LITIG. 149, 161-62 (2005) (discussing the
relationship of John Doe proceedings to the DMCA).
55. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 736 (explaining that copyright infringement was
traditionally only a misdemeanor). Only recently has it been categorized as a felony. In
addition, criminal liability did not previously attach without a profit motive. Now
infringement even for personal use is criminal. Id.; see also supra notes 7-13 and
accompanying text.
56. See Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the
DMCA’s Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 652 (discussing the failure
of other solutions, like technological controls, to limit copyright infringement); see also
Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004).
57. See Sara Calabro, RIAA Lawsuits—Music Industry Mistakes Its Lawsuits for a
PR Maneuver, PUB. REL. WK., Sept. 22, 2003, at 9 (describing the case of a twelve-yearold girl who was fined $2000 and arguing that the RIAA’s strategy has led to public
relations problems).
58. A Pew Internet & American Life study estimated that in the months following
publicity about the first round of RIAA’s suits against end users, file sharing dropped
substantially. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Pew Internet Project Data Memo, Pew
Internet & Am. Life Project (March 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_
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strategy has not focused heavily on changing existing social norms.59
This is noteworthy given that a substantial gap between formal law and
community norms can eventually undermine the legitimacy of the law.60
If the law prohibits behaviors that are widely known to be common, it
may lose legitimacy or credibility.61 This lack of alignment is exacerbated
Filesharing_March05.pdf. Pew researchers conducted a series of telephone surveys of
American Internet users during the years 2000 and 2005. The survey asked respondents
whether they ever downloaded music onto their computers. The percentage answering
“yes” to this question moved from 22% in mid 2000, up to 30% just before the RIAA
lawsuits were publicized in summer 2003, and down to 14% in November, 2003. Id. at
10-11. The most recent result is 22% as of March 2005. Note that even though the
wording of the question remained the same across time, the meaning of the question
likely changed. In 2000, there were relatively few methods for downloading music in
accordance with copyright restrictions, so that of the 22% who were downloading music
in 2000, a large portion probably violated copyright restrictions. In contrast, the current
availability of online music services like iTunes raises the possibility that music
downloading in the most recent survey is lawful. On the other hand, there is probably
more awareness today of the unlawfulness of peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted files,
introducing the possibility that the more recent surveys are biased downward. See also
Hughes, supra note 24, at 743-44 (arguing that the RIAA lawsuits could have been
responsible for the rise in record sales toward the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004);
Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve-Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good Targets for
the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELLECTUAL PROP.
133, 153-55 (2006) (providing a useful chart of the Pew Survey results and arguing that
unlawful file sharing has probably decreased as a result of the RIAA lawsuits); cf. David
Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property
Reverse Private Attorney General Regulation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1715-16
(2005) (arguing that file sharing is increasing because the RIAA litigation has fueled a
technological arms race); John Reinan, 4 Minnesotans Are Sued in War on ‘Songlifting,’
STAR TRIBUNE., Apr. 26, 2006, § B, at 1 (discussing estimates that the number of file
sharers has increased 115% (to over 9 million people) since the RIAA lawsuits in
September 2003).
59. It did, however, trot out artists like Metallica to try to convince people to stop
copying music. See Strauss, supra note 45; see also Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of
Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 742 (2005) (urging policymakers to focus on
social norms in crafting a solution to the problem of unauthorized file sharing).
60. Both economists and psychologists recognize that credibility and legitimacy
are important for encouraging self-regulation and compliance. See IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 49
(1992) (showing how unreasonable OSHA regulations discourage plant managers from
complying); see also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982).
61. See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (demonstrating
empirically that perceived legal injustice can lead to decreased compliance with
unrelated laws). This idea also has been investigated in the context of the acceptable
degree of punishment for crime. For a discussion of the importance of an “accepted”
ratio between a crime and its punishment, see V. Lee Hamilton & Steve Rytina, Social
Consensus on Norms of Justice: Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 85 AM. J. SOC.
1117 (1980); see also A. Michell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Fairness of Sanctions:
Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 223 (2000)
(arguing, similarly, that criminal sanctions should be proportionate to the gravity of the act
committed). Moreover, it should be noted that the negative effects of over enforcement are
not related only to legitimacy; overenforcement can sometimes lead to changes in
incentives that will, in turn, lead to an undesired outcome for the regulation at issue. See,
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with file sharing because its social approval is perceived as so prevalent
that many otherwise law abiding people simply do not care whether the
activity is legally prohibited.
III. EFFECT OF LAWS ON SOCIAL NORMS
Existing work on the expressive function of the law explores how the
law might help shape social norms and increase legal compliance. From
a policy perspective, the unique approach of law and economics, in
contrast to that of the sociology of law, derives from its focus on what
norms scholars call “norms management.”62 Law and economics of
norms (LEN) scholars focusing on norms management have emphasized
the proactive role that the law must take to shape social norms and
optimize behavior with a minimum of costly intervention. The extent and
nature of the influence of law on social norms, however, is the subject of
debate within the current literature. In fact, LEN scholarship may be
divided into three camps with regard to the relationship between formal
laws and norms. Those in the first category argue that using law to shape
social norms is likely to disrupt the desirable functions of those norms.
The second group argues that law is unlikely to lead to any change in the
functioning of norms. Finally, the third camp views law as an important
tool that could move social norms in the direction desired by policymakers.
A. The Destructive Impact of Formal Laws on the Function
and Nature of Norms
Many LEN scholars have argued that formal laws can have devastating
effects on the content and function of desirable or efficient norms,
including Bernstein,63 Posner,64 Brown,65 Kagan, and others.66 This section
e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 117 (1979) (discussing the idea that severe penalties will be counterproductive).
62. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2001)
(illustrating the “norm management” approach in the context of recycling).
63. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (discussing the
supremacy of norms over laws in business communities).
64. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996) (discussing the
factors that influence the efficacy of groups’ enforcement mechanisms).
65. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2001) (calling for a civil, regulatory
alternative to street crime enforcement).
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reviews some of the mechanisms suggested by LEN scholars to account
for this destructive effect.
Frey is the leading economist to explore possible psychological
mechanisms underlying the destructive potential of law on norms,
marked by the crowding out of internal and non-calculative motivations
that can occur when external motivation is introduced.67 Frey conducted
a study and found that residents were more likely to oppose a nuclear
plant in their neighborhood if they were offered compensation.68
The related “fine is a price” mechanism describes a phenomenon that
Gneezy and Rustichini documented in the context of daycare centers that
assessed fines upon parents who were late in picking up their children at
the end of the day.69 Imposing a fine on late parents was counterproductive,
resulting in an increased number of late pickups. Apparently, the fine
led parents to feel licensed to arrive late. In this sense, law undermined
the preexisting norm of arriving on time. In another study on the potentially
disruptive effect of law, Stout and Blair focused on the negative impact
of regulation on people’s sense of their own trustworthiness.70 They
suggest that regulating the duty of loyalty might be counterproductive
and offer a mechanism like the crowding out mechanism discussed in
the experimental studies, but they focus on the effect of formal
requirements on interpersonal relationships rather than individual
motivations.

66. See Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunnigham, & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining
Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 51 (2003) (describing the existence of different compliance styles of
managers).
67. For an early study, see Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated
Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971)
(building the psychological foundations for the “crowding out” paradigm used by lawyer
economists).
68. See Bruno S. Frey, Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-Out Effect, in
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 437 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (demonstrating the decline in intrinsic motivation which is
created by the existence of external rewards); Sandra H. Berry & David E. Kanouse,
Physician Response to a Mailed Survey: An Experiment in Timing of Payment, 51 PUB.
OPINION Q. 102 (1987) (presenting a real life illustration of the “crowding out”
phenomenon); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out
Voluntary Cooperation? (Feb. 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=229047 (arguing for the
need of a more complex model to fully capture the crowding out effect). But see Bruno
S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001)
(acknowledging that this phenomenon is still questioned by mainstream economists
despite its emergence across multiple experiments).
69. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2000).
70. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
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Following a similar line of reasoning, Cohen discusses the negative
impact of legality on social capital via the concept of the “Good
Samaritan.”71 On a motivational level, he argues, imposing a duty to
help on people with special qualifications could disrupt volunteer
activities because people will be less likely to acquire these skills. More
generally, he argues that the reputation associated with being a Good
Samaritan will disappear if helping becomes a legal requirement.
In a related vein, Dan Kahan argues that policies can be counterproductive
when they assume that people are wealth maximizers who cannot be
counted on to contribute to public goods and therefore introduce
incentives that dissipate trust.72 For example, a policy that assumes, on
the one hand, that people will avoid paying taxes will provide an
incentive to pay in the form of threatened punishment. On the other
hand, such a policy overlooks the possibility that threatened punishment
is perceived as a signal that tax evasion is widespread.73 Because people
resist being taken advantage of by being the only ones who contribute to
a public good, tax compliance can therefore decrease in the presence of
threatened punishment. In this way, incentives can crowd out altruism
because they eliminate the opportunity to demonstrate altruism and good
will by signaling to others that few people are contributing.
In a study on attitudes toward file sharing, DePoorter and Vanneste
found mixed evidence for the proposition that formal law can have
perverse effects on existing norms. Among those who already engage in
unlawful file sharing, the practice was seen as more ethical under a
severe punishment regime, compared to a light punishment regime.74
On the other hand, among those who do not engage in file sharing, the
severe punishment regime caused the practice to be viewed as less
ethical than in the light punishment regime.

71. See Mark A. Cohen, Norms Versus Laws: Economic Theory and the Choice of
Social Institutions, in SOCIAL NORMS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 95 (Kenneth J.
Koford & Jeffrey B. Miller eds., 1991).
72. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333
(2001).
73. A similar phenomenon has been confirmed recently in a study of attitudes
toward file sharing, which found that increasing threatened punishment causes people
who do not engage in unlawful file sharing to believe that the practice is widespread.
Ben DePoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1157 (2005).
74. See id. at 1151-54.
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B. The Lack of Impact of Formal Laws on Social Norms
There is another, less well-known, body of scholarship which suggests
that the effect of law on social norms is minimal because most existing
norms exert such a strong influence on behavior. For example, in a study
conducted in the context of environmental regulatory regimes, economic
and normative influences were at least as important as formal regulation
for the environmental performance of corporations.75 In another example,
Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson76 argue that most people do not know
the specifics of the criminal law; instead, their preexisting moral
intuitions—not the law itself—guide their perceptions of the law. In this
sense, criminal law does not influence social norms; social norms and
moral intuitions actually influence beliefs about what the law is.
C. The Constructive Impact of Formal Laws on the
Function and Nature of Social Norms
Another strand of legal scholarship focuses on the expressive function
of the law and emphasizes the positive effect that laws could have on
norms.77 For example, McAdams argues that law has a positive effect
on norms because citizens view law as information that helps them make
decisions about whether to engage in particular behaviors. According to
McAdams’s attitudinal theory of expressive law, enacting law solves a
pluralistic ignorance problem by signaling the underlying attitudes of a
community or society.78 Therefore, people are motivated to seek the
approval—or avoid the disapproval—of others, and the information
signaled by legislation provides a guide for engaging in socially approved
behavior. In addition to signaling a community’s attitudes, law can also
serve as a credible signal about risky or beneficial behaviors—smoking
or wearing seatbelts, for example.79 According to this informational
account of law’s expressive function, the legislative process aggregates
information to produce a decision that is superior to the opinion of any
individual legislator.80 As a result, if a legislative body prohibits public
75. See Kagan et al., supra note 66, at 58-66.
76. See John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith, & Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165 (2001).
77. See Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression,
Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000) (reviewing his earlier model
and suggesting a three-fold model of the effect of legality on behavior).
78. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339, 340 (2000).
79. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury
Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1 (2003).
80. Id. at 6.
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smoking, people might be less likely to smoke publicly and more likely
to enforce the norm against others because the process of enacting the
legislation leads people to update their beliefs.81
Similarly, Alex Geisinger argues that law leads to “belief change”
about the behavior which law seeks to regulate, thus leading to changes
in social norms and preferences.82 Robert Cooter suggests that enacting
law might move people from an inferior equilibrium to a superior
equilibrium.83 According to this model, the law might change the
normative beliefs of enough people to lead to an actual change in their
behavior. Under certain conditions, this change will decrease the costs84
of compliance for many others, shifting even larger portions of the
population into lawful behavior. Kagan and others demonstrated the
informative role of law in an environmental context. They focused on the
informative value of the law as the enforcer of the norms, as opposed to
the targets, and showed how the law clarifies the boundary between
activity which is harmful to the environment and activity which should
be tolerated.85
Moving beyond the informative contribution that the declarative
aspects of the law make to norms, numerous studies have demonstrated
that the deterrence mechanism has had positive effects on the
internalization of existing norms.86 That is, the threat of sanctions is
sometimes enough, in and of itself, to convince people that the regulated
behavior is morally problematic. For example, in a correlational study,
Paternoster and others showed that perceived punishment is a significant

81. Id. at 7-11.
82. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 35, 70 (2002).
83. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996).
84. Here, cost is considered in terms of informal sanctions.
85. “The law on the books . . . is a benchmark for enforcers of both the social and
economic license. Exposure of substantial legal noncompliance is taken by both
community activists and professional investors as a justification for skepticism about the
environmental good faith or the competence of mill managers.” Kagan et al., supra note
66, at 79.
86. See GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal
Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442, 453 (1976); Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins,
The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social Change, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 33 (1971)
(demonstrating empirically the effect of legal sanction on morality).
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predictor of an act’s perceived morality.87 This suggests that formal
deterrence is needed to maintain the credibility of informal sanctions. In
an experimental setting, Schwartz and Orleans demonstrated in the
context of tax compliance that people in a “fear-of-punishment” group
were more likely to feel a moral duty to pay taxes than those in a control
group.88 Therefore, deterrence can actually enhance internal motivation
rather than crowding it out.
Information and deterrence are not the only ways in which law can
directly shape and encourage desirable social norms. Edward Cheng
argues that laws can regulate behavior indirectly by subtly reshaping
environmental conditions that give rise to the prohibited behavior.89 By
minimizing opportunities to engage in a prohibited behavior, law can
force people to default to lawful behavior simply because the prohibited
behavior is too inconvenient or complicated. The desired conduct then
arises by default, and this in turn gives rise to social norms that further
enforce the desired conduct. Law can influence social norms by “tak[ing]
advantage of the natural inclination to follow routines and the tendency
for social norms and institutions to form around them.”90 Therefore, the
scholarship in this final category generally supports the view that the
expressive function of the law can enhance personal and social norms,
thus increasing the legal obedience of citizens.
D. Understanding the Effect of Law on Social Norms
As this short review of LEN scholarship has demonstrated, there are
many conflicting perspectives and approaches to the interaction between
formal laws and norms. Even though the importance of norms is
recognized, the relationship between law and norms remains largely
unexplored. One key unanswered question is how formal law affects
social norms at the outset. This question is central to creating a coherent
view of the ability of law to change social norms in a desired direction.
Without a clear account of the mechanism by which the announcement
of a law can change the perception of norms, it is impossible to predict
the influence of legality on norms. This Article seeks to develop an
account of the behavioral mechanism responsible for the effect of law on
87. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do
Sanctions Really Deter?, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457 (1983).
88. See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 274 (1967) (comparing experimentally the effect of morality and formal sanction
on individuals’ tax evasion behavior).
89. Cheng, supra note 1, at 662-65; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (arguing that architecture can be harnessed to
control crime).
90. Cheng, supra note 1, at 665.
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norms. By answering this question, we can better address policy
questions about closing the gap between law and file sharing norms.
E. Empirical Research on the Expressive Function of Law
The following questions are embedded in attempts to define the
expressive function of the law: What gives the law its expressive ability?
Why would people care about the inoperative facets of the law? More
specifically, why would people, upon hearing about a new law, think
that it is likely to influence the social norms about the regulated
behavior?
Bohnet and Cooter maintain that the expressive power of the law
derives both from the state’s credibility with citizens and from preexisting
multiple equilibria in the underlying system of social interactions.91
Credibility, as they examine it, is based not on any moral ground, but on
the fact that citizens historically complied with the laws. Similarly,
McAdams and Nadler argue that in coordination situations, the expressive
power of law derives from law making one of several equilibria salient,
thus allowing people to form expectations about what others are likely to
do.92
McAdams’s attitudinal theory of expressive law holds that because
legislatures’ actions generally represent the will of the majority, new
legislation informs people about the majority view.93 Geisinger builds
on this view, and argues that a change in law can influence an
individual’s beliefs about the desirability of a behavior—drunk driving
or seatbelt wearing, for example.94 Both authors base these accounts on
the idea that the expressive effect of the law works through its ability to
change beliefs about what others will think about the regulated behavior.
It is not clear, however, what aspect of the law causes people to believe
that most others will adhere to it.
The meaning of consensus is not always clear in existing work on the
expressive function of the law. A closer look at some of the expressive
law studies shows that they differ not only in their assessments of the
91. See Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing and
Equilibrium Selection (Nov. 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=452420.
92. See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of
Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove
Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 116-17 (2005).
93. See McAdams, supra note 78.
94. See Geisinger, supra note 82, at 70.
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types of expressive processes that occur following the announcement of
the law, but also in their definitions of consensus.
The expressive models that refer to coordination, focal points, and
tipping points argue that the expressive function of law works through
its capacity to inform people as to how others will behave when they
hear about the law.95 Other models, of the kind discussed by McAdams,96
Scott,97 and Cooter,98 focus on the effect of law on the approval patterns
of other people, such as assumptions that once a law has been passed it
will increase their chances of facing social disapproval. The difference
between what social psychologists refer to as “injunctive norms” and
“descriptive norms” explains the difference between these accounts.
Descriptive norms are how most people would behave in comparable
situations. Injunctive norms refer to the extent to which most people
would approve of the target behavior.99
F. The Current Study
What is it about law that would cause a citizen to believe that other
people would change their behavior following announcement of that
law? The social context in which most people operate limits their ability
to confirm their beliefs about the relevant social norm. Therefore,
people must rely on their perception of the social norm when they
estimate the expected social and formal costs they will have to pay when
engaging in socially undesirable activities. Under these conditions of
95. See Bohnet & Cooter, supra note 91; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point
Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (arguing that the law helps solve
coordination problems by suggesting a focal point on which all parties can agree ex
ante); McAdams & Nadler, supra note 92.
96. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 365 (1997) (discussing the role of esteem in social
sanctioning).
97. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV 1603, 1614 (2000):
Why might the Smiths revise their estimate of the probabilities of sanction
without experiencing a change in their preferences or in the underlying norms?
The Smiths, as all of us, recognize that statutes are enacted only if . . . a
substantial majority of the community has at least a weak preference for the
new rule . . . .
98. See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
947, 972-78 (1997) (arguing for certain conditions that should be fulfilled for the
emergence of “perfect” informal sanctions).
99. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., Normative Influences in Organizations, in
SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 195 (Leigh
L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that injunctive norms have a stronger effect on
behavior than descriptive norms); see also Anders Biel et al., Norm Perception and
Cooperation in Large Scale Social Dilemmas, in RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS:
DYNAMIC, STRUCTURAL, AND INTERGROUP ASPECTS 245 (Margaret Foddy et al. eds.,
1999) (discussing some of the pitfalls in the operation of norms in large scale contexts).

598

FELDMAN-NADLER POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

[VOL. 43: 577, 2006]

11/9/2006 3:14 PM

The Law and Norms of File Sharing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

uncertainty, it is important to understand both how law affects norms
and how people believe a particular law will affect norms.
Therefore, this Article focuses on the effect of law on beliefs about the
social norm of the regulated behavior instead of the previous approaches
of either: (1) exploring the effect of law on norms by measuring
behavioral change across different times and different places, as in
classical law and society studies;100 or (2) examining the effect of laws
on behavior in coordination game settings, as in certain law and economics
studies.101 This experiment examines why the law leads to changes in
perceptions about social norms. Because people are unlikely to accurately
attribute their reasons for changing their views about social norms upon
learning that a given behavior is illegal, this study did not pose that
question directly. Instead, it varied, one at a time, the salience of several
features of law that might influence perceptions of the relevant social
norm. Examining various perceptions of social norms associated with
different features of law creates a better understanding of the mechanism
by which law influences perceptions of the relevant social norms.
Following the widely recognized taxonomies of individual motivation
to follow the law, as discussed in LEN scholarship,102 psychology,103 and
political science,104 and the leading models discussed in the expressive
law scholarship, this study explores potential explanations for why, upon
learning about a law, people would perceive others to be likely to obey
it. It further examines which of the leading mechanisms will have the
strongest effect in the context of copyright law insofar as it regulates file
sharing.
100. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992) (analyzing
the effect of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on organizational norms and describing how state
laws have been converted into organizational norms).
101. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
102. See Cooter, supra note 77, at 20-21 (discussing the interaction of expression,
deterrence, and internalization with promulgation of a law).
103. See John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in
STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150, 155-56 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959) (suggesting a fivefold taxonomy of the factors that affect the ability of a social source to influence people);
Herbert C. Kelman, Processes of Opinion Change, 25 PUB. OPINION Q. 57, 62-66 (1961)
(suggesting a three-stage model of social influence); June Louin Tapp & Lawrence
Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 89, 91-92 (June Louin Tapp
& Felice J. Levine eds., 1977) (suggesting a three-fold taxonomy of individuals based on
their motivation to comply with the law).
104. See Kagan et al., supra note 66, at 53.
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The fact that file sharing is so widespread allows us to examine
questions about the effect of law on social norms that cannot be easily
examined otherwise. Music file sharing is relevant and salient to the
college student population that was the object of the study. Second, file
sharing is a practice where one can expect meaningful variation in the
responses of college students, unlike the crimes of homicide, robbery, or
embezzlement. Also, unlike these crimes, file sharing is a practice
where social desirability is less likely to prevent participants from giving
honest answers. Finally, file sharing is a timely issue.
The experiment considered four possible mechanisms for the effect of
law on perceptions of the social norm:
Proposition I (The Citizenship Proposition): Simply making the
legal rule itself salient is sufficient to change views about file sharing
norms. This could be true because people think that others believe the
law should be obeyed.105 In this account, people reason that others pay
attention to and obey law simply because the law deserves obedience
and deference. If a new law says that file sharing is prohibited, people
will assume that others will defer to it simply because of its status as
law.
Proposition II (The Formal Sanctions Proposition): Making the
legal rule salient is sufficient to change views of file sharing norms to
the extent that the formal sanctions associated with law are also made
salient. This proposition is consistent with virtually all accounts of
deterrence theory, such as Bentham,106 Becker,107 and Paternoster and
others.108 This proposition is also consistent with the view that people
assume others obey the law because they are deterred by the risk of
punishment.109
Proposition III (The Informal Sanctions Proposition): Making the
legal rule salient is sufficient to change views of file sharing norms to
the extent that the law can facilitate the imposition of social costs on
transgressors. This is consistent with the work of scholars who
emphasize the importance of law in facilitating esteem110 and shame.111
105. See Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey
Evidence, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 427 (1977) (arguing that most Americans obey the law
simply because they believe that the law should be obeyed).
106. See 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 86-91 (1962).
107. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968), for the classical model of deterrence.
108. See Paternoster et al., supra note 87.
109. See Catherine A. Sanderson & John M. Darley, “I Am Moral, but You Are
Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law, 32 J. APPL. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 375 (2002).
110. See McAdams, supra note 96; see also Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss,
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Proposition IV (The Morality Proposition): Making the legal rule
salient is sufficient to change views of file sharing norms, so long as the
law represents values that correspond to moral values, and those moral
values are made salient. This proposition is consistent with the work of
Schwartz and Orleans,112 and Tyler.113
IV. METHODOLOGY
General theoretical questions regarding the expressive function of the
law and specific questions regarding the effect of law on file sharing
norms are both ripe for empirical investigation. This Article reports the
results of an original experimental survey. This method has the advantage
of permitting strong causal inferences about the relationship between
law and social norms that are the subject of the inquiry. Specifically, by
varying the salience of various legal characteristics—such as
underlying moral justifications, sanctions imposed on violators, and
perceived legitimacy—while keeping other information constant, the
study facilitates strong causal claims about how different characteristics
of law influence social norms. After presenting the legal frame, we
measured the effect of variation on both perceived social norms about
file sharing and the subjects’ own intention to share files. This
methodology also benefits from its focus on unlawful music file sharing.
Unlike many experiments that use abstract questions or stylized games,
it uses detailed vignettes about a subject with which our sample of
college students was very familiar.114

Why Do We Care What Others Think About Us?, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND
ORGANIZATION, supra note 67, at 133 (formal analysis of personal quests for status); Dan
M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349
(1997).
111. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999);
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996)
(advocating shaming penalties in some circumstances to reduce criminal activity).
112. Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 88.
113. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-7 (1990) (arguing that care
for procedural fairness is one of the main motivations underlying lawful behavior).
114. Scenario methods, like this one, are limited because they do not measure actual
behavior. Of course, measuring unlawful behavior is difficult in any context. To the
extent that one can measure it using existing datasets, such as estimates of the numbers
of files unlawfully shared during a given time period, one necessarily sacrifices the
ability to make strong causal inferences.
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A. Procedure
Two hundred and forty undergraduate students at a large public
university in the United States participated in the study. Students
completed questionnaires in class and received a small bag of candy for
their participation. At the top of the first page of the questionnaire,
students were explicitly told that their responses would remain strictly
anonymous. Names of students were not collected; the questionnaire
was administered in a large classroom, and participation was voluntary;
no record was kept of who participated and who did not. Given the
dominance of this age group in unlawful file sharing, the use of college
students is natural. The Authors do not claim, however, that this sample
is representative of the general population.
The legal frame was varied by randomly dividing the sample into five
equal subgroups and making controlled changes to the descriptions of
the scenario presented to the participants. Specifically, the experiment
contrasted two minimal frames in which law is either: (1) not mentioned
at all (Control); or (2) mentioned only in the abstract (Law Only), with
three different frames which presented a specific set of formal sanctions,
informal sanctions, or moral justifications associated with the law. Each
participant read only one of the versions described below.
1. Control Group: The Control group received the following
instructions:
We are interested in examining students’ attitudes regarding file-sharing and
downloading the creative work of others (e.g., music) without permission. You
might be asked to answer questions about future behavior of other students, that
you do not have personal knowledge about, and we would like you to take your
best guess. Because we are collecting data from many students, we are simply
interested in your overall estimations.

2. Law Only Group: In addition to the instructions given to the
Control group, the Law Only group received the following instructions:
You are told that the following statement will be sent via email and snail mail to
all registered students, staff members, and faculty members at UC Berkeley,
prior to January 1, 2004:
The University of California, as part of the higher-education community, must
strike a balance between the interests of the academic community in using the
full capabilities of technology for lawful purposes, and the interests of creators
and licensors of intellectual property in protecting their works from
unauthorized use, copying, and distribution. The University of California
requires everyone in its community to abide by the network use policies and
COMPLY WITH COPYRIGHT LAW. Copying or sharing music or other copyrighted
material, including software, without a permissible copyright defense, such as
Fair Use, or a valid license, IS A VIOLATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS WELL AS
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS.
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3. Formal Sanctions Group: In addition to the instructions given to
the Law Only group, the Formal Sanctions group was instructed as
follows:
As of spring 2004, any member of the University community who copies or
shares music or other copyrighted material without a valid license or
permission, shall be subject to the following:
1. First offense: warning only
2. Second offense: 30 day suspension of all University Network
privileges, including email
3. Third offense:
a. For students, one semester leave of absence, during which all
University privileges are suspended, and no course credit can
be earned
b. For faculty and staff, one semester leave of absence without
pay, during which all University privileges are suspended
4. Fourth offense: permanent separation from the University.
Violators shall be served with formal notice of each violation observed

4. Informal Sanctions Group: In addition to the instructions given to
the Law Only group, the Informal Sanctions group received the
following instructions:
As of Spring 2004, any member of the University community who copies or
shares music or other copyrighted material without a valid license or
permission, shall be subject to the following:
1. Violators shall be served with formal notice of each violation observed.
2. Each week, the University will publish on its website the names
of community members who were found to be in violation of
University regulations regarding the use of copyrighted work.
3. The Web page containing names of violators will be accessible
to the public.

5. Moral Duty Group: In addition to the instructions given to the
Law Only group, the moral duty group received the following
instructions:
It is important to recognize that the activities of community members who
violate the University’s copyright regulations harm the University community at
large. The University networks at times have been slowed to a crawl by the high
volume of music and other large files constantly downloaded. This crippling of
our networks directly compromises the University’s ability to maintain
excellence in teaching and research.
Moreover, file-sharing and downloading of creative work of others without
valid license undermines the abilities of artists to enjoy the fruits of their labor.
It is the university position that such practice is as morally problematic as
walking into a music store and walking out with a CD without paying.

603

FELDMAN-NADLER POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

11/9/2006 3:14 PM

Community members are therefore urged to refrain from engaging in unlawful
file sharing activity that compromises the University’s networks and harms
talented young artists.

Following the presentation of the scenario, the study measured the
participants’ responses as discussed below.
B. Measures115
After reading one of the legal frames discussed above, participants
answered a questionnaire. All questions about future attitudes and
behavior were framed according to the likelihood of the event in
question occurring anytime within the next calendar year. The questions
covered five categories.
1. Descriptive norm (Perception That Others Share Files) measured
the extent to which the specific legal frame influenced the perception of
the prevalence of file sharing among other students, both in terms of the
estimated proportion of students who engage in file sharing and the
estimated number of songs that other students download from the
Internet.116
2. Injunctive norm (Perception That Others Approve) measured the
extent to which the specific legal frame influenced perceptions that other
students would think file sharing was appropriate and that parents and
professors would approve of the participant’s own file sharing
behavior.117
3. Willingness to express disapproval toward violators measured the
extent to which the specific legal frame influenced participants’
willingness to express disapproval directly to other students who
download music and the extent to which they would engage in such
forms of social sanctioning.118
115. Excerpts from the questionnaires with the full text of the items appear in the
Appendix.
116. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the three
questions appearing under the Descriptive Norm section in the Appendix. These three
questions appeared to reliably measure the underlying construct of “descriptive norm”
Cronbach’s Alpha = .80. Cronbach’s Alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of
items, and ranges between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency.
See RICK H. HOYLE, ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed.
2002).
117. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the five
questions appearing under the Injunctive Norm section in the Appendix. Cronbach’s
Alpha = .62. Note that questions two through five were reverse coded to remain
consistent with the Descriptive Norm variable, where more file sharing corresponds to a
higher score; similarly here, more approval for file sharing corresponds to a higher score.
118. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the two
questions appearing under the Willingness to Punish section in the Appendix.
Cronbach’s Alpha = .81.

604

FELDMAN-NADLER POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

[VOL. 43: 577, 2006]

11/9/2006 3:14 PM

The Law and Norms of File Sharing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

4. Own intention to share files measured the extent to which the
specific legal frame influenced participants’ perceptions about the
likelihood that they would share music files with their friends, the
likelihood they would download music themselves, and the number of
songs they would download.119
5. Moral norm measured the extent to which the specific legal frame
influenced participants’ perceptions about how guilty they would feel
about sharing files, their moral obligation to abstain from downloading
music, and their sense of the wrongfulness of file sharing.120
C. Results
The experiment tested whether the legal frame presented (Control,
Law Only, Formal Sanctions, Informal Sanctions, or Morality) influenced
participants’ perceptions of various file sharing norms and behavioral
intentions, measured by the five variables just discussed. Overall, the
legal frame had a statistically significant effect on these five dependent
measures as a group.121 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for each
group, and the following section discusses the results for each measured
variable.
1. The Effect of the Legal Frame on the Descriptive Norm
(Perception That Others will Share Files)
We first examined whether the legal frame changed perceptions of the
extent to which other students will share files, and found that the legal
frame did in fact have an overall effect on the descriptive norm.122 On
the one hand, presenting a legal frame (Law Only, Formal Sanctions,
119. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the three
questions appearing under the Intention section in the Appendix. Cronbach’s Alpha =
.84.
120. This variable was constructed by computing the mean of responses to the three
questions appearing under the Morality section in the Appendix. Question 1 was reverse
coded. Cronbach’s Alpha = .77.
121. F(20, 904) = 2.11; p<.01, η2 = .045. The analysis used a multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA), a statistical technique for assessing the simultaneous effect of
an independent variable on two or more dependent criterion variables. See JAMES H.
BRAY & SCOTT E. MAXWELL, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 7-8 (1985).
Throughout this Article “p” refers to the probability of finding a difference or
relationship between groups as large as that observed if there were, in fact, no difference
or relationship between them. “η2” is a measure of the difference between groups.
122. F(4, 227) = 2.75; p < .05; η2 = .046.
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Informal Sanctions, or Morality) did not change the descriptive norm
relative to presenting no legal frame at all (Control). On the other hand,
presenting the Formal Sanctions or Informal Sanctions frames decreased
the perception that others would engage in file sharing, relative to
presenting the Law Only frame. In other words, compared to simply
stating that file sharing is against the law, announcing the prospect of
concrete punishment, such as losing network privileges, or being
publicly shamed, such as having one’s name posted on a website, led to
perceptions that unlawful file sharing behavior would decrease.
2. The Effect of the Legal Frame on the Injunctive Norm
(Perception That Others Will Approve of Sharing Files)
The legal frame did in fact have an overall effect on the injunctive
norm—the perception that others will approve of sharing files.123 As
with the descriptive norm results just discussed, presenting any legal
frame did not change the injunctive norm relative to the Control. At the
same time, presentation of the Informal Sanctions legal frame, in which
violators face publication of their names, seemed to influence the
injunctive norm most distinctly. Relative to the Law Only frame, the
Informal Sanctions frame decreased perceptions that other students
would approve of file sharing.
3. The Effect of the Legal Frame on Willingness to Express
Disapproval Toward Violators
The legal frame caused an overall change in the extent to which
students report that they would be willing to express disapproval toward
others who share files unlawfully.124 It is first worth observing that
respondents were generally unwilling to confront a fellow student about
file sharing—the mean response in all groups was less than three out of
ten, where ten represents “very likely.” A clear pattern of differences
between groups emerges, however, where students presented with the
Informal Sanctions legal frame reported being more willing to express
disapproval toward violators than students in any other group. Thus, it
appears that awareness of possible publication of violators’ names
increases the reported willingness to confront violators directly and
express disapproval.

123.
124.
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4. The Effect of the Legal Frame on Intention to Share Files
The legal frame changed overall self-reported intentions to share
files.125 Specifically, Formal Sanctions had a deterrent effect that
decreased students’ own willingness to share files relative to the Control
frame or the Law Only frame.
5. The Effect of the Legal Frame on Moral Norms Against File Sharing
There was no overall effect of the Law Only frame on moral norms
against file sharing.126
TABLE 1. ATTITUDES TOWARD FILE SHARING: DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS
Perception

Others File

Others

Own

Own

Moral Norm

Share

Approve of

Willingness

Intention to

to Not File

(Descriptive

File Sharing

to Express

File Share

Share

Norm)

(Injunctive

Disapproval

Norm)
Treatment

Mean

Control

(SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean

(SD)

Mean

(SD)

Mean

(SD)

7.19a,b (2.05)

7.24a,b (1.50)

2.11a

(1.74)

6.61a

(2.27)

3.90

(2.55)

7.50a (1.73)

7.76b

(1.23)

1.95a

(1.40)

6.57a

(2.45)

3.64

(2.22)

6.59b

(1.80)

7.54b

(1.40)

1.90a

(1.22)

5.20b

(2.82)

4.39

(2.47)

6.57b

(2.29)

6.78a

(1.64)

2.88b

(2.11)

5.50a,b (2.67)

4.28

(2.33)

7.55a

(1.70)

7.29a,b (1.31)

1.87a

(1.03)

5.99a,b (3.16)

4.46

(2.32)

Group
Law Only
Group
Formal
Sanctions
Group
Informal
Sanctions
Group
Morality

Group
Means without shared subscripts denote differences within a column at p<.05. That is, within a
column, numbers with different subscripts are statistically different from one another; those with
identical subscripts are statistically indistinguishable. All column heading constructs were
measured on ten point scales with a higher value indicating stronger endorsement of the construct.
SD refers to standard deviation.

125.
126.

F(4, 227) = 2.54; p < .05; η2 = .043.
F(4, 227) = 1.01; p = .41.

607

FELDMAN-NADLER POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

11/9/2006 3:14 PM

V. DISCUSSION
A. No Observed Effect of Law Alone
The experiment showed no evidence of an effect of expressive law on
any of the dependent measures. That is, relative to the Control frame,
simply reminding people that file sharing is a violation of both copyright
law and university regulations had no measurable effect on the perceived
prevalence of file sharing, the perceived approval for file sharing,
people’s own intention to file share or express disapproval toward file
sharers, or moral attitudes toward file sharing. Simply announcing the
law was not enough to shift either perceptions of norms or intentions.
Note, however, that the experiment did not test theories of expressive
law based on the idea that law works by announcing something other
than the status quo. Many theories of expressive law posit that a new
law might have the effect of changing the norm precisely because the
law announces a change from the status quo. This announced change in
law in turn changes beliefs about the likelihood that others would
approve of the prohibited conduct. The study, on the other hand, did not
announce the passage of a new law—merely new university regulations
that prohibited already illegal behavior. It is possible that many accounts
of expressive law would not predict any change in perceived norms—
either descriptive or prescriptive—in our experimental situation because
the announced regulations were simply reinforcing existing law and
would not give rise to a reassessment of social pressure to refrain.
In addition, the experiment tested one specific law that is atypical—
file sharing, where prohibitions are notoriously disobeyed. Nonetheless,
the results suggest that in the context of file sharing, the salience of
existing copyright law by itself cannot lead to any expressive change
when people are not reminded of its ability to impose cost and
internalization functions.
In some sense, the overall pattern of these findings is quite consistent
with theories of expressive law that posit the influence of an announced
change in law on norms and behavior. Note that the two legal frames
that exerted the most consistent effects on norms and intentions were
Formal Sanctions and Informal Sanctions. These were also the only two
frames that announced a change in law. The other legal frames—Law
Only and Morality—simply highlighted existing law. Of course, the
Formal and Informal Sanctions frames also introduced new sanctions, so
it is impossible to separate the effects of deterrence from the effects of
legal expression. The more important point, however, is that simply
highlighting an already existing law, as in the Law Only frame, did not
appear to change perceived norms or behavioral intentions.

608

FELDMAN-NADLER POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

[VOL. 43: 577, 2006]

11/9/2006 3:14 PM

The Law and Norms of File Sharing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

B. The Effect of Sanctions
1. The Effect of Sanctions on the Descriptive Norm
The two most influential legal frames for both norms and behavioral
intentions were the threats of Formal Sanctions and Informal Sanctions.
Compared to highlighting the law alone, the perceived prevalence of file
sharing decreased only when the threat of formal punishment, such as
expulsion from the university, or informal punishment through shaming,
such as publicizing names on a website, loomed large. This finding
implies that law might have the ability to shift or strengthen existing
descriptive norms by imposing costs.127 A demonstrated relationship
between threatened sanctions and perceived prevalence would support
accounts of expressive law that emphasize the ability to increase the
price of noncompliance.128
2. The Effect of Sanctions on the Injunctive Norm
Besides effects on descriptive norms, the study showed that the threat
of informal sanctions influenced the injunctive norm by enhancing
perception that other students view file sharing as unacceptable. This
finding is consistent with accounts of expressive law which specify a
central role for informal sanctions.129 In our study, the explicit informal
sanction—publicizing on a public website the name of each person
caught violating the law—led to the perception of increased social
disapproval for file sharing itself. In other words, announcing that
names of copyright violators would be publicized led people to expect
both that the consensus about file sharing would change and that social
approval of the practice would decline. The announcement of this
sanction may have carried an implicit message that the underlying
behavior is socially inappropriate which led to a change in the perceived
social approval of file sharing.

127. Other scholars argue, however, that when the costs become too severe, there
can be a backlash where the perceived prevalence of file sharing begins to increase, at
least among law abiders. See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 73, at 1147.
128. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
129. See Cooter, supra note 98; McAdams, supra note 96 (arguing for a model of
social norms based on competition for esteem).
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3. The Effect of Sanctions on the Willingness to
Express Disapproval of Violators
According to scholars such as Cooter130 and Axelrod,131 the willingness
of people to enforce norms is the only mechanism that can ensure a
stable decentralized system of governance.132 In our experiment, the
Informal Sanctions legal frame increased the likelihood that people
would be willing to express disapproval directly to others who share
files; neither Morality, Formal Sanctions, nor Law Only increased
participants’ willingness to punish others who share files. Therefore,
publicizing the names of copyright violators made people more willing
both to openly disapprove of file sharing practices and to impose
sanctions against violators. Assuming that our participants perceived the
publication as associated with shame, these findings support the idea
that, in some situations, shaming sanctions are likely to deter behavior,
which is consistent with legal scholars who argue that shaming can
complement other sanctions for purposes of enforcement.133
4. The Effect of Sanctions on Intention to Share Files
The Formal Sanctions legal frame led to a significant decrease in the
individual’s self-reported intention to share files. The ability of formal
sanctions—such as expulsion from the university—to effect compliance
with the law is consistent, of course, with any standard account of
deterrence. The Informal Sanctions legal frame did not have an observable
effect on intentions to comply with the law, contrary to other studies that
emphasize the importance of social approval on compliance.134 Note,
however, that unlike prior studies, the social sanctions in this experiment
were not decentralized. Prior studies have examined the effect of
preexisting, naturally occurring social sanctions and their relationship to
self-reported compliance with the law. This experiment attempted to
130. See Cooter, supra note 98, at 969 (“Effective sanctions lead to successful
social norms, whereas ineffective sanctions cause norms to fail.”).
131. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)
(demonstrating the efficacy of “TIT FOR TAT” strategy).
132. This refers to norms that govern behavior without state intervention. See
Kahan & Posner, supra note 111 (discussing the efficiency of non-legal sanctions); see
also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137
(2002) (examining willingness to engage in costly punishing behavior).
133. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999)
(demonstrating, through the phenomenon of “date rape,” the need for shaming sanctions
to define the border between sex and rape).
134. See Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant
Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
837 (1990), for caveats in the traditional deterrence model.
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facilitate the imposition of social costs by announcing sanctions that
would publicize the names of violators. Presumably, people perceive
identification of a person as a violator as generating social costs like
shame.135 Although both this experiment136 and prior studies report that
the file sharing norm is deeply entrenched, shaming nonetheless seems
effective for changing the perception of the norm and increasing
willingness to socially sanction violators.137 Thus, even when violating
the law seems to be a very common practice, people still did not want
their identity exposed and were willing to socially sanction others when
the authorities stigmatized such behavior.
The law influenced perceptions of the file sharing norm when
sanctions were made salient but not when law alone was made salient.
This reinforces that, to some degree, the law derives its ability to change
perceptions of social norms from its ability to impose costs, either formal
or informal. These findings are consistent with previous empirical work
showing that the influence of law on moral beliefs is sometimes
moderated by the perceived likelihood of formal sanctions.138 Citizens
see laws that impose neither formal nor informal sanctions as lacking
credibility, and their enactment might lead to unanticipated results.
Therefore, the expressive function of the law does not always function as
an independent mechanism.
C. The Unique Context of File Sharing
Using a specific law helps illuminate how citizens respond to
regulation of specific forms of intellectual property—an important
problem for those industries that hope to protect their intellectual
property rights. On the other hand, caution is warranted in the extent to
which one should generalize from file sharing to other practices that law
seeks to regulate. File sharing restrictions are unusual due to the degree
135. Note that the specter of having one’s name publicized might also lead one to
estimate that the chances of being caught and punished formally will increase because
publication would assist authorities in identifying violators, leading people to be less
likely to share copyrighted files.
136. In this study, the students sampled believed that a majority of students shared
files.
137. See Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Shame: Why More
Shaming May Deter Less (2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789244
(demonstrating, using formal modeling, that policymakers should not shame too many
individuals to avoid a reduction in the effectiveness of that shaming penalty).
138. See Paternoster et al., supra note 87.
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that people violate them. In this case, the law does not enjoy much
legitimacy, does not seem to widely represent moral values, and does not
seem to enjoy much credibility or compliance. It is therefore possible
that the attempts to measure the effects of expressive law in the Law
Only or Morality legal frames did not succeed because the law in
question does not enjoy widespread legitimacy. Therefore, these results
should not suggest that expressive law in general is largely based on the
ability of the law to impose social and formal sanctions.139 These
conclusions are limited to file sharing.
In this study, making the moral justifications of the law salient had no
measurable effect on perceptions of the social norm, willingness to
enforce the norm, or intention to share files. Economists who discuss
social norms have debated whether there is a need for moral resentment
for people to be willing to enforce norms. Scholars such as Mansbridge,140
and to some extent even Cooter,141 have argued that without internalization
of values and moral resentment, people will not be willing to enforce
social norms. Others scholars, notably Sugden,142 have argued the contrary:
any violation of expectation would be seen as a justifiable reason for
social disapproval, regardless of the moral appeal of the law. The
findings reported in this Article seem to weigh in favor of those who
argue that morality is not required for social sanctioning. The Informal
Sanction legal frame had a much stronger effect on perceived social
approval, suggesting that moral resentment is not required. Furthermore,
morality had no effect on people’s willingness to sanction others.
D. Policy Implications
These results demonstrate the importance of costs—and especially
informal sanctions—in copyright law’s ability to change perceptions of
the prevalence and social desirability of file sharing. They support the
view that attaching costs to the announcement of the law enhances the
law’s ability to change perceptions of the consensus; simply announcing
the law did not change the prevalence or social desirability of the law.
139. For example, Feldman has shown that morality accounted most for the effect
of trade secret law on the prevalence of knowledge sharing by high tech employees. See
Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of the Expressive Function of Trade-Secret
Laws: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation and Consensus (Bar-Ilan Univ., Working
Paper No. 1-04, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=56224.
140. See Jane Mansbridge, Starting with Nothing: On the Impossibility of
Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION,
supra note 67, at 151 (discussing that it is impossible to base social norms enforcement
only on self-interest and that considerations of justice are necessary to understand the
maintenance of norms).
141. See Cooter, supra note 98.
142. See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989).
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Furthermore, there was no evidence of either a crowding out phenomenon,
in which the salience of deterrence led to some resistance, or a reduction
of the importance of internal motivation.143 Even if we recognize the
existence of a separate influence of law on behavior that is not mediated
by cost, we must not underestimate the importance of costs in the
expressive function of the law.
Moving away from the broader discussion of the expressive function
of the law, the results highlight three implications for file sharing policy.
First, contrary to the view that pervasive file sharing is explained by
poor awareness of its illegality, these findings suggest that neither lack
of awareness nor lack of thought about the law explain the pervasiveness
of file sharing. If ignorance of the law explains its prevalence, we would
expect that simply reminding people about the law would lead to a
decrease in intention to share files. Instead, simply informing participants
about the illegality of file sharing did not influence their intention. It is
more plausible that many people are already aware of the unlawful
nature of sharing copyrighted works, especially given the intense media
focus on this issue in recent years.
Second, the results suggest that the private and relatively anonymous
nature of file sharing is one reason for its popularity.144 Assertions that
violators’ identities would be exposed influenced both intentions to
share files and perceptions of file sharing norms most strongly. The
prospect of formal punishment also had some effect,145 but the music
industry may be able to reap deterrent effects simply by threatening to
publicize the names of especially flagrant violators. This strategy has
143. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An
Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997), for an
additional illustration of the crowding out effect.
144. In fact, Attorney General John Ashcroft discussed this anonymity as the main
reason for the need for criminal sanction in a statement made on August 25, 2004.
The execution of today’s warrants disrupted an extensive peer-to-peer network
suspected of enabling users to traffic illegally in music, films, software and
published works. The Department of Justice is committed to enforcing
intellectual property laws, and we will pursue those who steal copyrighted
materials even when they try to hide behind the false anonymity of peer-topeer networks.
Department of Justice Brings First Criminal Enforcement Action Against Peer-to-Peer
Copyright Piracy, 21 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 33 (2004) (emphasis added).
145. See Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The
Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1999) (discussing various
factors repeat players could consider when deciding whether to litigate against
individuals).
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practical advantages as well, given the cost inefficiencies of bringing
lawsuits against individuals with limited resources. First, the RIAA has
targeted individuals who engage in a large volume of file sharing, but a
substantial portion of these heavy users are minors. As a result, the
parents of these defendants end up paying for their children’s behavior.
Another inefficiency is the lawsuits’ divisive nature; because some see
these lawsuits as a large wealthy industry pursuing hapless young file
sharers, the industry bears a public relations cost, although the extent of
the cost is debatable.146 A third inefficiency relates to the pervasiveness
of the practice. Individuals may reason that it is worthwhile to continue
sharing files because the likelihood of being targeted is very low.
Individuals know that lawsuits are expensive and that the RIAA must
limit their targets to a very small fraction of the entire population of file
sharers. Finally, a vast majority of the lawsuits have ended with
settlements, resulting in less publicity for the RIAA than if they were
able to take any given case to trial.
This study indicates the effectiveness of threatening to publicize
violators’ names. Even in a widely shared practice like file sharing, the
potential effect of shaming seems especially promising. This is contrary
to some scholars who study shaming147 and argue that it cannot work
when the practice is prevalent. These results suggest that people are
hesitant to be branded as engaging in an illegal activity, even when it
seems that many others participate. This approach has obvious limitations
from both privacy and deterrence perspectives, but when a change in
norms is required for legal compliance, shaming could be more cost
effective than litigation.
Third, it is worth examining the RIAA’s strategy of appealing to
morality in the form of advertising where popular artists try to explain
why violating copyright is morally unjustified. In this experiment, the
attempt to make morality salient was not effective at either enhancing
compliance with copyright laws or changing perceptions of others’ file
sharing behavior and attitudes toward file sharing. Furthermore, there
was some suggestion that making morality salient might lead to the
perception that others are more likely to approve of file sharing.148 This
somewhat surprising effect, while theoretically supported,149 is troubling
146. See Hughes, supra note 24, at 731 (arguing that the public relations downside
of suing individual users was overestimated).
147. See Harel & Klement, supra note 137.
148. Note, however, that this difference did not reach conventional levels of
statistical significance.
149. See Sanderson & Darley, supra note 109. Significantly, Sanderson and
Darley’s findings are more complex, taking into account both the type of the offense and
the type of individual.
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from a policy perspective. Circumstances might exist in which appeals to
morality have an inadvertent effect on the perception of norms. Of
course, this experiment’s attempt to make moral considerations salient
may have simply been too weak to have a measurable effect. A stronger
attempt, like using a popular artist to explain how copyright violation
affects them directly, may have the desired effects.
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APPENDIX
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Note: Headings in brackets are provided here for informational
purposes and were not included in the actual materials presented to
participants.
[DESCRIPTIVE NORM]
1. In 2004, how often will other students download music files using
the university network?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Never

Very Often

2. In 2004, how often will students give their friends music files that
they have downloaded using the university network?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Never

Very Often

3. In 2004, what percentage of other students will download more than
one song per week using the university network?
%0-10 10-20 2 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60

60-70

70-80

80-90

90-100%

[INJUNCTIVE NORMS]
1. In 2004, will other students think that downloading music files is
harmless, like playing a game?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at All

Very Much So

2. In 2004, will other students think that one ought to be extremely
careful never to download any music file using the university network?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at All

Very Much So

3. In 2004, how likely is it that your parents would disapprove upon
hearing that you have downloaded music files using the university
network?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at All
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4. In 2004, how likely is it that a typical professor would disapprove
upon hearing that you have downloaded music files using the university
network?
Unlikely =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Likely =10

5. In 2004, what proportion of students would disapprove upon
hearing that you have downloaded music files using the university
network?
%0-10 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100%

[WILLINGNESS TO PUNISH OTHERS]
1. How likely would you be to make a remark to a fellow student to
convey your disapproval upon hearing that she has downloaded music
files using the university network?
Unlikely =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Likely =10

2. How likely would you be to make a remark to another student to
convey your disapproval upon hearing that she has shared music files
using the university network?
Unlikely =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Likely =10

[INTENTION]
1. In 2004, how likely is it that you will share one music file with your
fellow students using the university network?
Unlikely =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Likely =10

2. It is now 2004. Suppose that your favorite artist has just released a
new CD. You heard a few cuts for the first time on the radio and there is
one song in particular that you really like. You would really like to have
the song so you can play it whenever you want, but your budget is tight
and you can’t justify spending the money on buying the CD. Just then,
your friend emails you to say that the song is available unofficially
online, and sends you the link to a site where an anonymous music fan
has posted the song. How likely is it that you would download the song,
using the university network?
Unlikely=1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Likely=10
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3. Out of curiosity, you go to the site and discover that not only is the
new song from your favorite artist posted, but also posted are hundreds
of other songs that you would really love to have. (You figure that this
anonymous fan must have the same taste in music as you). How many
of the songs do you think you would download, using the university
network?
None =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

All =10

[MORALITY]
1. In 2004, I will NOT feel guilty at all if I download music files using
the university network.
Agree =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Disagree =10

2. In 2004, I will feel that it is morally wrong for me to download
music files using the university network.
Agree =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Disagree =10

3. In 2004, will you feel that you will have a moral obligation to never
download music files using the university network?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at All

10
Very Much So

[PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF PUNISHMENT]
In your estimation, how many of the students who disobey this
regulation by downloading music files using the university network, will
face any kind of formal sanctions or discipline?
Few = 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Many =10

How likely is it that a typical student, who repeatedly violated this
regulation by downloading music files, using the university network,
would face any kind of formal sanctions or discipline?
Unlikely =1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Likely= 10

In your estimation what percentage of the students who violate this
regulation by downloading music files will eventually be caught by the
university authorities?
%0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100%
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